These are the books that had the greatest impact on my worldview. All of them are from the last few years, which emcompass my intellectual journey from political apathy and economic naiveté, to being a radical libertarian anarchist and Austrian economist.
I list the books in the order that I (first) read them, with the year in which I first read them in brackets. This post is not to be taken as a blanket endorsement of these books. They are the ones that influenced me most, not those I consider the greatest works, nor those that I would recommend to others necessarily.
1. The Road To Serfdom, F.A. Hayek (2007) – This book introduced me to a new way of thinking about politics. It introduced me to basing political views on principles rather than on whims. I identified myself as an individualist, and became opposed to all forms of collectivism. I understood that governments, even if they start off extremely limited, will always tend to grow, especially if the public has a collectivist mindset.
2. The Revolution: A Manifesto, Ron Paul (2008) – Ron Paul cured my apathy about politics. I found him online in November 2007, and became a massive fan very quickly. He took principled positions, he obviously knew what he was talking about economically, and had held those stances his whole career without wavering or compromising. I began questioning my own views about the role of government. I stopped believing in the left-right paradigm, and started to understand a far better paradigm: libertarianism versus statism.
3. Economics in One Lesson, Henry Hazlitt (2008) – The title is so appealing that I made this the first book on economics I read. I found it through the Ludwig von Mises Institute, which Ron Paul had directed me towards. Immediately, the fallacies of mainstream economics, and the wealth-destroying nature of socialism and all kinds of interventionism, became apparent to me. Hazlitt’s lesson is so remarkably powerful, that I immediately felt confident enough to reveal my political preferences publicly and argue for free markets in practically every area of society. The economic arguments in favor of a state are untenable, and quite obviously so.
4. For A New Liberty, Murray Rothbard (2008) – It took me about 9 months to go from a Ron Paul-inspired limited constitutional government position, to a full libertarian anarchist position. More than any other author, Murray Rothbard deserves most of the credit for that. This book was so clear, and made the case so powerfully, that I instantly saw the superiority of the anarchist position. It was also the first time I had encountered an explanation of how security and law can be provided without a government.
5. Anarchy and the Law, Edward Stringham et al (2008) – This compilation of essays and book excerpts sealed my anarchism. I read alternative justifications for and visions of anarchy: from David Friedman, Linda and Morris Tannehill, Randy Barnett, Roderick Long, Roy Childs, Hans Hermann Hoppe, John Hasnas. These all helped shape my worldview and especially sharpened up my thinking about how security and law can be provided without a state.
6. The Enterprise of Law, Bruce Benson (2009) – This book gave me my first encounter of public-choice economics. Benson took a whole different approach to Rothbard and Friedman, with a great deal of historical, empirical research into customary law, as well as a detailed analysis of the state law-making process and how it compares to law produced by private courts.
7. Democracy: The God That Failed, Hans-Hermann Hoppe (2009) – Just when I thought my political views were fully-formed, Hoppe hit me with his idea that monarchy is superior to democracy (though anarchy is still best of all, of course). I had taken it as given that if we must have a state, let it at least be democratic, and I had always seen the recent historical transition from monarchies to democracies as a positive thing. This book changed my view completely, and gave me a whole lot more reasons to oppose modern states. If we must have a state, let it at least be a monarchy, I now say.
8. Boundaries of Order, Butler Shaffer (2010) – This book played a vital role in my forming my position, contra Rothbard, as a subjectivist ethicist. In particular, it provided me with the terminology that reveals the flaws in his natural rights justification for libertarianism. It allowed me to move past Rothbard and develop a sophisticated subjectivist justification for libertarianism, free from terminological baggage and smuggled norms.
9. The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins (2010) – I thought I understood evolution pretty well, until I read this book. I had not realised the importance of asking at what level evolution takes place. It is at the level of the gene, and this has enormous implications for how we view evolution. I was struck by the beauty and structure to be found in nature and evolution, as Dawkins masterfully described. I was fascinated by the idea that morality can be explained in evolutionary terms; this idea fit perfectly with my subjective ethics worldview.
10. How The Mind Works, Steven Pinker (2010) – This book is full of remarkable ideas, about how our minds evolved to deal with reality. It brings to life the story of how and why we developed language, self-awareness and morality. I have not yet fully absorbed all that this book has to offer, and will probably need to read it a few more times before I feel I have a good grasp on it. But I already feel that it has had a profound affect on my thinking.
Looking over my list, the thing that jumps out at me is that there is no Ludwig von Mises. He will have to be contented that his views influenced me through others: particularly Rothbard, Hoppe, Hazlitt and Paul. Human Action, Theory and History and Socialism come closest to being on this list. His shorter works, The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality, Profit and Loss, and Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth all deserve a mention as well.
Murray Rothbard is probably my single greatest influence, and if I had the space, would have had more than one entry in this top ten. I learned economics from Man, Economy and State, and The Ethics of Liberty was highly influential as well. Rothbard’s crowning glory, however, has to be his epic A History of Economic Thought, which shows off his masterly scholarly skills, and wonderful writing style, to the maximum.
Some more short works that influenced me include The Politics of Disobedience (Etienne de la Boetie), The Production of Security (Gustave de Molinari), No Treason (Lysander Spooner), Against Intellectual Property (Stephan Kinsella) and The Depoliticization of Law (John Hasnas).
Journal of a Libertarian Anarchist and Austrian Economist
Sunday, 27 February 2011
Monday, 10 January 2011
A Critique of Murray Rothbard's Idea of a "Basic Legal Code"
Here is a passage from The Ethics of Liberty:
Firstly: how detailed it this basic law code? Consider the two extremes:
Rothbard says that the basic law code will be agreed upon by all reasonable courts. I take him to mean everybody except serial killers, rapists etc, i.e. 99% of the population. With such widespread agreement required, it seems hopelessly unrealistic to suppose that the basic law code is narrowly defined, down to the last detail. Even among libertarians, there is a disagreement over IP, abortion, punishments, etc. There is no way the entire population of reasonable people is going to agree on every little detail of libertarian theory. The entire field of economic analysis of law - how laws get produced and what kinds of laws get produced - is skipped over by making this supposition.
To Rothbard, there were two types of court: reasonable courts, which have signed up to the basic law code, and outlaw courts, which have not. Rothbard does not provide any analysis - any mechanism - of how reasonable courts and outlaw courts will resolve disputes between them. This may not be much of an issue if we assume 99% of courts are reasonable, but see above.
So maybe the basic law code is broadly defined, leaving a lot of scope for interpretation, so that widespread agreement is possible. But then how will disputes about things which might fall into the area of interpretation - say IP disputes - get resolved? There needs to be a mechanism to explain this... how disputes between courts which have both agreed to the basic (broadly defined) law code will be resolved, when their interpretation of that law code differs. Rothbard has not provided us with a mechanism for this.
David Friedman, in chapter 29 of The Machinery of Freedom, has described a mechanism for how courts which provide different laws (perhaps very different laws) will resolve their disputes: the bargaining process.
[L]aw and the State are both conceptually and historically separable, and law would develop in an anarchistic market society without any form of State. Specifically, the concrete form of anarchist legal institutions—judges, arbitrators, procedural methods for resolving disputes, etc.—would indeed grow by a market invisible-hand process, while the basic Law Code (requiring that no one invade any one else’s person and property) would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies, just as all the competing judges once agreed to apply and extend the basic principles of the customary or common law. But the latter, again, would imply no unified legal system or dominant protective agency. Any agencies that transgressed the basic libertarian code would be open outlaws and aggressors, and Nozick himself concedes that, lacking legitimacy, such outlaw agencies would probably not do very well in an anarchist society.Here is the problem as I see it, with this idea of a "basic law code"...
Firstly: how detailed it this basic law code? Consider the two extremes:
- Broadly defined. "No one may invade anyone else's person and property". No more detail than that. ("Invade" and "property" are not given definitions... that is for the courts to interpret)
- Narrowly defined. The basic law code is identical to the libertarian law code, as developed by Rothbard, Kinsella, Block, etc... down to the details... like the basic law code is specific about IP, abortion, capital punishment, etc. (There is very little scope for interpretation of the basic legal code... the courts task is limited to applying the law code)
Rothbard says that the basic law code will be agreed upon by all reasonable courts. I take him to mean everybody except serial killers, rapists etc, i.e. 99% of the population. With such widespread agreement required, it seems hopelessly unrealistic to suppose that the basic law code is narrowly defined, down to the last detail. Even among libertarians, there is a disagreement over IP, abortion, punishments, etc. There is no way the entire population of reasonable people is going to agree on every little detail of libertarian theory. The entire field of economic analysis of law - how laws get produced and what kinds of laws get produced - is skipped over by making this supposition.
To Rothbard, there were two types of court: reasonable courts, which have signed up to the basic law code, and outlaw courts, which have not. Rothbard does not provide any analysis - any mechanism - of how reasonable courts and outlaw courts will resolve disputes between them. This may not be much of an issue if we assume 99% of courts are reasonable, but see above.
So maybe the basic law code is broadly defined, leaving a lot of scope for interpretation, so that widespread agreement is possible. But then how will disputes about things which might fall into the area of interpretation - say IP disputes - get resolved? There needs to be a mechanism to explain this... how disputes between courts which have both agreed to the basic (broadly defined) law code will be resolved, when their interpretation of that law code differs. Rothbard has not provided us with a mechanism for this.
David Friedman, in chapter 29 of The Machinery of Freedom, has described a mechanism for how courts which provide different laws (perhaps very different laws) will resolve their disputes: the bargaining process.
One can imagine an idealized bargaining process, for this or any other dispute, as follows: Two agencies are negotiating whether to recognize a pro- or anti-capital-punishment court. The pro agency calculates that getting a pro-capital-punishment court will be worth $20,000 a year to its customers; that is the additional amount it can get for its services if they include a guarantee of capital punishment in case of disputes with the other agency. The anti-capital-punishment agency calculates a corresponding figure of $40,000. It offers the pro agency $30,000 a year in exchange for accepting an anti-capital-punishment court. The pro agency accepts. Now the anti-capital-punishment agency can raise its rates enough to bring in an extra $35,000. Its customers are happy, since the guarantee of no capital punishment is worth more than that. The agency is happy; it is getting an extra $5,000 a year profit. The pro agency cuts its rates by an amount that costs it $25,000 a year. This lets it keep its customers and even get more, since the savings is more than enough to make up to them for not getting the court of their choice. It, too, is making a $5,000 a year profit on the transaction. As in any good trade, everyone gains.The same mechanism applies to all courts, so there is no need to call some courts "outlaw courts." Hence the idea of a basic law code dissolves. Each court is just producing laws, which may or may not be close to plumbline libertarian laws.
Saturday, 11 December 2010
Can the Non-Aggression Principle be "proved"?
All political philosophies are concerned with who has ultimate decision-making jurisdiction (ownership rights) over which scarce objects (property). That is, they are concerned with how property rights are assigned. Different political philosophies have different principles by which they assign property rights. Libertarianism is based on the principles of homesteading and voluntary exchange. Those principles are used to determine who owns what, and hence who has what rights.
The Non-Aggression Principle, or NAP, is in one sense trivial, because aggression is really defined as a violation of a legitimate property boundary, so it all depends on what property boundaries are legitimate. Everyone supports "non-aggression", except that libertarians and non-libertarians have a different idea of what constitutes aggression, because they assign property rights according to different principles. In this sense, NAP is a fairly useless term, as it is simply a re-statement of the task of political philosophy: to give meaning to aggression, to explain what constitutes aggression, to say what property boundaries are legitimate.
In another sense, if we take the A of "NAP" as meaning specifically the libertarian idea of aggression, then it is simply a restatement of the libertarian principles for assigning property rights. To "prove the NAP" (in this second sense) would be to "prove the libertarian principles of homesteading and voluntary exchange for assigning property rights".
Can this be proved? To prove it would mean to say that homesteading and voluntary exchange, as principles for assigning property rights, are not just a preference (subjective), but that they are the objectively correct principles for assigning property rights. Hans Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics is one attempt to do this.
What argumentation ethics actually proves, in my opinion, is different. I do not believe it "proves the NAP" or "proves libertarian ethics" which is what I believe it sets out to do. I think the clearest explanation of argumentation ethics comes from Stephan Kinsella: here.
The problem is right here at the start. Is a theory of rights something that can be justified through argumentation? Is there a correct view of rights? Does that question even make sense?
Libertarian rights can be argued for because they are good (they appeal to our human senses of right/wrong) and beneficial (breed prosperity). But this is a justification of libertarianism as a means for already existing ends. It is not justifying them as an end, saying "this is the correct theory of rights, anyone supporting any other theory of rights is incorrect." It is saying "if you think initiating coercion is unethical, or if you just prefer prosperity to poverty, then libertarian ethic is the correct ethic for you".
The rest of Hoppe's argumentation ethics may be (and, I think, is) sound, but what I think it proves is if there is such a thing as objective ethics, i.e. if it is possible to show that one ethic is correct and all others are incorrect, then the libertarian ethic is the only correct and true theory of ethics.
So if a socialist says "I support socialism because it is correct and libertarianism is incorrect", then we could show that he is making a performative contradiction and what he says is not true. If there is such a thing as a correct ethic, libertarianism is it.
But most socialists don't claim that their ethic is correct, just that (they think) it is good and beneficial. The way to counter this is 1) to show that the libertarian ethic is actually the most beneficial ethic (using Austrian economics) and 2) by appealing to their personal ethical values, their sense of justice, of right and wrong, and helping them to see that the socialist ethic is really not one that any good person should be in favor of.
It does not make sense to talk about correctness/incorrectness, and hence of proofs, in the realm of ethics. Ethical values are values; they are subjective. We can appeal to non-libertarians' personal ethical values (showing they conflict with their political ethical values), and we can show them their political ethical values, when implemented via laws, have bad consequences; but we cannot present them with any proof that they are incorrect to hold to the political ethical values that they do. Political philosophy is simply not a subject which has objectively correct and incorrect answers, except as a means of achieving a particular goal.
Note: this is a copy of a post I made at the Mises forums: here.
The Non-Aggression Principle, or NAP, is in one sense trivial, because aggression is really defined as a violation of a legitimate property boundary, so it all depends on what property boundaries are legitimate. Everyone supports "non-aggression", except that libertarians and non-libertarians have a different idea of what constitutes aggression, because they assign property rights according to different principles. In this sense, NAP is a fairly useless term, as it is simply a re-statement of the task of political philosophy: to give meaning to aggression, to explain what constitutes aggression, to say what property boundaries are legitimate.
In another sense, if we take the A of "NAP" as meaning specifically the libertarian idea of aggression, then it is simply a restatement of the libertarian principles for assigning property rights. To "prove the NAP" (in this second sense) would be to "prove the libertarian principles of homesteading and voluntary exchange for assigning property rights".
Can this be proved? To prove it would mean to say that homesteading and voluntary exchange, as principles for assigning property rights, are not just a preference (subjective), but that they are the objectively correct principles for assigning property rights. Hans Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics is one attempt to do this.
What argumentation ethics actually proves, in my opinion, is different. I do not believe it "proves the NAP" or "proves libertarian ethics" which is what I believe it sets out to do. I think the clearest explanation of argumentation ethics comes from Stephan Kinsella: here.
So the question is, does Hoppe's theory establish that the libertarian view of rights, as opposed to competing views, is the correct one?
...
Hoppe starts by noting that if any proposed theory of rights is going to be justified, it has to be justified in the course of an argument (discourse).
The problem is right here at the start. Is a theory of rights something that can be justified through argumentation? Is there a correct view of rights? Does that question even make sense?
Libertarian rights can be argued for because they are good (they appeal to our human senses of right/wrong) and beneficial (breed prosperity). But this is a justification of libertarianism as a means for already existing ends. It is not justifying them as an end, saying "this is the correct theory of rights, anyone supporting any other theory of rights is incorrect." It is saying "if you think initiating coercion is unethical, or if you just prefer prosperity to poverty, then libertarian ethic is the correct ethic for you".
The rest of Hoppe's argumentation ethics may be (and, I think, is) sound, but what I think it proves is if there is such a thing as objective ethics, i.e. if it is possible to show that one ethic is correct and all others are incorrect, then the libertarian ethic is the only correct and true theory of ethics.
So if a socialist says "I support socialism because it is correct and libertarianism is incorrect", then we could show that he is making a performative contradiction and what he says is not true. If there is such a thing as a correct ethic, libertarianism is it.
But most socialists don't claim that their ethic is correct, just that (they think) it is good and beneficial. The way to counter this is 1) to show that the libertarian ethic is actually the most beneficial ethic (using Austrian economics) and 2) by appealing to their personal ethical values, their sense of justice, of right and wrong, and helping them to see that the socialist ethic is really not one that any good person should be in favor of.
It does not make sense to talk about correctness/incorrectness, and hence of proofs, in the realm of ethics. Ethical values are values; they are subjective. We can appeal to non-libertarians' personal ethical values (showing they conflict with their political ethical values), and we can show them their political ethical values, when implemented via laws, have bad consequences; but we cannot present them with any proof that they are incorrect to hold to the political ethical values that they do. Political philosophy is simply not a subject which has objectively correct and incorrect answers, except as a means of achieving a particular goal.
Note: this is a copy of a post I made at the Mises forums: here.
Environmentalists should be libertarians
Environmentalists should be libertarians because free markets will in most cases better satisfy their desires - saving the whales, preserving forests, stopping animal cruelty, etc - than will socialist alternatives.
Libertarians qua libertarians do not have a view on whether any particular environmentalist goal is worth it or not. We just say let's have a free market so that the views of everyone are encapsulated in free market prices, so that the amount of resources devoted to particular and environmental causes generally is precisely the amount of resources that the individuals in society are willing to devote to them.
The alternative is having the politicians guessing this and using highly inefficient (and unethical) socialist techniques to try to achieve environmentalist goals. Also, there are the usual public choice problems associated with socialism and democracy in particular: pandering to special interests, bribery, corruption, short-term thinking, waste, etc. These are widespread problems when it comes to state environmental policy-making.
Libertarians qua libertarians do not have a view on whether any particular environmentalist goal is worth it or not. We just say let's have a free market so that the views of everyone are encapsulated in free market prices, so that the amount of resources devoted to particular and environmental causes generally is precisely the amount of resources that the individuals in society are willing to devote to them.
The alternative is having the politicians guessing this and using highly inefficient (and unethical) socialist techniques to try to achieve environmentalist goals. Also, there are the usual public choice problems associated with socialism and democracy in particular: pandering to special interests, bribery, corruption, short-term thinking, waste, etc. These are widespread problems when it comes to state environmental policy-making.
Saturday, 27 November 2010
Secession: Who Decides?
The EU is deeply unpopular in the UK and other European nations. The British people never voted to join the EU, and if there were a referendum, I have little doubt that the result would be Yes for the UK to withdraw (secede) from the EU. The EU has brought about a resurgence in nationalism, and rightly so.
That no referendum has taken place is profoundly unjust. Membership of the EU should be decided upon by the British people, not by politicians, nor by anyone outside the UK.
But why stop at the secession of the UK from the EU? Consider Scotland. Who should decide whether Scotland should secede from the UK? To be consistent, it should be the people of Scotland, not politicians, and not the people of the UK. If the Scottish people want to secede from the Union, it is unethical for anyone to prevent this. Membership of the UK should be decided upon by the Scottish people.
The same principle applies at an even more local level. If the people of the county of Cornwall, or Yorkshire, or Buckinghamshire wish to secede from the UK, or the people of the city of Oxford, or Liverpool, or Bristol wish to secede from the UK, it would be unethical for anyone to prevent their secession.
Perhaps you can see where this is going. If a small village community, or a family, or a single individual wish to secede from whichever state they are a subject of, who should decide? Well, the secessionist(s) themselves, of course, and not the entity they wish to secede from.
If one opposes the EU and believes in the right of secession at all, they must recognize the right of individual secession. That is, they must recognize the right of any individual to stop paying taxes and to stop following the rules and regulations forced upon him by the state, whenever he wishes.
Nationalism, while preferable to internationalism, is a blatantly inconsistent doctrine. The only consistent positions are a one-world government (which is justifiably, almost-universally unpopular) or individual secessionism, also known as libertarian anarchy.
That no referendum has taken place is profoundly unjust. Membership of the EU should be decided upon by the British people, not by politicians, nor by anyone outside the UK.
But why stop at the secession of the UK from the EU? Consider Scotland. Who should decide whether Scotland should secede from the UK? To be consistent, it should be the people of Scotland, not politicians, and not the people of the UK. If the Scottish people want to secede from the Union, it is unethical for anyone to prevent this. Membership of the UK should be decided upon by the Scottish people.
The same principle applies at an even more local level. If the people of the county of Cornwall, or Yorkshire, or Buckinghamshire wish to secede from the UK, or the people of the city of Oxford, or Liverpool, or Bristol wish to secede from the UK, it would be unethical for anyone to prevent their secession.
Perhaps you can see where this is going. If a small village community, or a family, or a single individual wish to secede from whichever state they are a subject of, who should decide? Well, the secessionist(s) themselves, of course, and not the entity they wish to secede from.
If one opposes the EU and believes in the right of secession at all, they must recognize the right of individual secession. That is, they must recognize the right of any individual to stop paying taxes and to stop following the rules and regulations forced upon him by the state, whenever he wishes.
Nationalism, while preferable to internationalism, is a blatantly inconsistent doctrine. The only consistent positions are a one-world government (which is justifiably, almost-universally unpopular) or individual secessionism, also known as libertarian anarchy.
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