The mind has evolved to analyse objects from three distinct perspectives: 1) purpose, 2) design and 3) structure. The perspective we take when analysing any given object is largely determined by how useful that perspective is for us to gain knowledge and understanding of the object.
1. We can analyse objects as having a purpose. This works very well for humans, and it also works for animals. When a saber tooth tiger is running towards you, a quick analysis is required. The analysis is: 'that tiger intends to eat me'. We think of the tiger as having intent. There is no time to analyse the design or structure of the tiger. In theory, there is no reason that we can't view plants or rocks as having a purpose, except that it is not useful for us to do so.
2. We can analyse objects as having a design. This can be useful, for example, when trying to understand a leaf. We analyse it as the part of a plant designed to capture light. We think of the leaf as having a function. We can understand a leaf better by taking the design perspective than any other. It is not useful to think of a leaf as "wanting" or "intending" to capture light. We also analyse human-produced objects from the design perspective, thinking of them in terms of their function.
3. We can analyse the structure, the physical properties of all objects. In some cases, where the above two perspectives are not useful at all, it is our only way of getting an understanding of the object. To understand a rock means to understand its structure; there is no additional usefulness from thinking of the rock from either the design perspective or the purpose perspective.
Praxeology is the study of what can be learned by contemplating, and drawing logical deductions from, the concept of action. Action is purposeful behaviour. Praxeology is therefore an example of taking the purpose perspective towards analysing objects.
Praxeological laws apply wherever there is action, that is, wherever we perceive an object as behaving with intent and purpose. The observation that most human behaviours are actions, that is, that humans are an example of beings that are usefully considered as purposeful beings, implies that praxeology is a very useful way of thinking about human behaviour. However, there is no particular reason why praxeology should be limited to humans. Non-human objects can also be usefully analysed as actors, such as the example of the saber tooth tiger above.
We may ask: is a saber tooth tiger really an acting being? That is, is the tiger really making choices about his behavior, or are its behaviors entirely instinctive? This question is really meaningless, however, when we consider purposefulness not as an attribute inherent to objects, but rather as an attribute that minds imbue onto objects, when it is useful to do so.
A purposeful behaviour (i.e. an action) is a behaviour that has been deliberated about and chosen over other behaviours. I have a clear conception that my own behaviours can be categorized into those undertaken with a purpose (e.g. typing on my keyboard), and those that are reflexes (e.g. sneezing). I then extrapolate this personal insight about me onto other human beings. I assume that the behaviours of other humans are not all reflexes. I assume that other human beings behave with a purpose, i.e. with intent, i.e. that other humans, like me, act.
I do this purely because it is more useful for me to think of other humans as acting beings, rather than purely reflexive beings. I do not know for certain whether other human beings are really acting; it is possible that everyone else, except for me, is purely reflexive and not really making choices at all.
In short, purposefulness/consiousness is not something inherent to objects. It is a word that denotes those objects that we can usefully analyse using a certain mode of analysis: the perspective of intent, desire, action. Praxeology is an example of this mode of analysis, and it may apply to any being that we find it useful to consider as purposeful - human or otherwise.
Note: This was originally posted as part of a conversation here at the Mises forum.
Journal of a Libertarian Anarchist and Austrian Economist
Thursday, 31 March 2011
Friday, 4 March 2011
How To Rescue A Child (without the State)
How might child abuse be handled in a stateless society?
The Scenario
Single-father Bob physically abuses his 3-year old daughter, Jane. (Jane’s mother died while giving birth to her, and there is no extended family.) A nursery nurse becomes suspicious that Bob may be mistreating Jane. She informs the charity Friends-of-Babies, which investigates cases of child abuse, and re-homes abused children. Friends-of-Babies investigate the allegations made by the nurse. They make an assessment, and conclude that Bob is indeed abusing Jane, and that she would be better off if she were removed from that situation, and re-homed with loving foster parents.
A Free Market in Law
Law is the resolution of disputes. What is being disputed here is the ownership right to raise Jane. Bob currently owns this right, and the Friends-of-Babies organization is challenging him for it; they are claiming it for themselves. Assuming Bob objects to the charity’s claim, there is a dispute and the case will go to court. The court will award the right to raise Jane to one disputant or the other.
Free markets produce according to consumer demand. Free market firms strive for excellence in satisfying consumers, and firms that fail to use resources efficiently for this purpose do not survive the competition. This is as true for a free market in the law industry as it is for any other industry. The laws that are produced are those that consumers demand. If free market courts produce laws that are seen as unfair or unjust, they will lose customers. For a free market court, a reputation for honesty, fairness, wisdom and good judgment is essential for continued business.
Friends-of-Babies present their evidence to the court. The court becomes convinced that Bob is an abusive parent. Now they must make their decision. Child abuse, of the kind Bob committed, is widely considered by individuals in society as sufficient justification for intervention; this child needs rescuing. Therefore the court will likely decide in favor of Friends-of-Babies. They would not want to be known as an organization that lets child abuse continue. Following the court decision, Bob must give up Jane to the charity. If he resists, the charity can physically take Jane from him, and Bob has no grounds to complain. Thus Jane is rescued from her abusive father, and is soon found a loving new home.
Some Objections
Now a few objections to this scenario…
1. What if Friends-of-Babies doesn’t exist?
Lots of people feel strongly about protecting children from abuse, and would be willing to donate to such an organization, so we may be confident that such charities will exist.
2. What if Bob doesn’t agree to go to court?
As with any dispute, the alternative to arbitration is a martial contest, which neither disputant wants. If Bob is innocent, he has incentive to go to court to defend himself against the spurious claim. If Bob is guilty, he still has an incentive to go to court, if only because the consequences of not going to court would be worse. With a court decision, the harm that Friends-of-Babies inflicts on Bob is strictly limited, but if Bob refuses to go to court (makes himself an outlaw), the actions taken against him could be much more severe.
3. How do you define ‘abuse’?
That is to be decided by the consumers of laws. There will always be different opinions about what actions justify intervening in the parent-child relationship. The variation will be reflected in the choice of laws offered to consumers, and could vary significantly between cultures. With no monopoly on law, there is no need to search for an ‘objective’ definition, and no need for universal agreement on the definition.
4. Isn’t this just kidnapping, and aggression against Bob?
See note…
5. Doesn’t this imply parental obligations, and “positive rights”?
See note…
Conclusion
I have outlined how child abuse might be handled in a stateless society, with free markets in law and child protection. For all the usual reasons that free markets are better than monopolies, we would expect the laws produced and the protection given to children to be superior with the free market system. Therefore, all other things being equal, children will be safer and child abuse will be far less common without the State.
Note
The last two objections involve libertarian legal theory. My answer is that this court decision may well be consistent with libertarianism. To understand how this could be the case, see Walter Block’s Libertarianism, positive obligations and property abandonment: children's rights, and Stephan Kinsella’s How We Come to Own Ourselves.
The Scenario
Single-father Bob physically abuses his 3-year old daughter, Jane. (Jane’s mother died while giving birth to her, and there is no extended family.) A nursery nurse becomes suspicious that Bob may be mistreating Jane. She informs the charity Friends-of-Babies, which investigates cases of child abuse, and re-homes abused children. Friends-of-Babies investigate the allegations made by the nurse. They make an assessment, and conclude that Bob is indeed abusing Jane, and that she would be better off if she were removed from that situation, and re-homed with loving foster parents.
A Free Market in Law
Law is the resolution of disputes. What is being disputed here is the ownership right to raise Jane. Bob currently owns this right, and the Friends-of-Babies organization is challenging him for it; they are claiming it for themselves. Assuming Bob objects to the charity’s claim, there is a dispute and the case will go to court. The court will award the right to raise Jane to one disputant or the other.
Free markets produce according to consumer demand. Free market firms strive for excellence in satisfying consumers, and firms that fail to use resources efficiently for this purpose do not survive the competition. This is as true for a free market in the law industry as it is for any other industry. The laws that are produced are those that consumers demand. If free market courts produce laws that are seen as unfair or unjust, they will lose customers. For a free market court, a reputation for honesty, fairness, wisdom and good judgment is essential for continued business.
Friends-of-Babies present their evidence to the court. The court becomes convinced that Bob is an abusive parent. Now they must make their decision. Child abuse, of the kind Bob committed, is widely considered by individuals in society as sufficient justification for intervention; this child needs rescuing. Therefore the court will likely decide in favor of Friends-of-Babies. They would not want to be known as an organization that lets child abuse continue. Following the court decision, Bob must give up Jane to the charity. If he resists, the charity can physically take Jane from him, and Bob has no grounds to complain. Thus Jane is rescued from her abusive father, and is soon found a loving new home.
Some Objections
Now a few objections to this scenario…
1. What if Friends-of-Babies doesn’t exist?
Lots of people feel strongly about protecting children from abuse, and would be willing to donate to such an organization, so we may be confident that such charities will exist.
2. What if Bob doesn’t agree to go to court?
As with any dispute, the alternative to arbitration is a martial contest, which neither disputant wants. If Bob is innocent, he has incentive to go to court to defend himself against the spurious claim. If Bob is guilty, he still has an incentive to go to court, if only because the consequences of not going to court would be worse. With a court decision, the harm that Friends-of-Babies inflicts on Bob is strictly limited, but if Bob refuses to go to court (makes himself an outlaw), the actions taken against him could be much more severe.
3. How do you define ‘abuse’?
That is to be decided by the consumers of laws. There will always be different opinions about what actions justify intervening in the parent-child relationship. The variation will be reflected in the choice of laws offered to consumers, and could vary significantly between cultures. With no monopoly on law, there is no need to search for an ‘objective’ definition, and no need for universal agreement on the definition.
4. Isn’t this just kidnapping, and aggression against Bob?
See note…
5. Doesn’t this imply parental obligations, and “positive rights”?
See note…
Conclusion
I have outlined how child abuse might be handled in a stateless society, with free markets in law and child protection. For all the usual reasons that free markets are better than monopolies, we would expect the laws produced and the protection given to children to be superior with the free market system. Therefore, all other things being equal, children will be safer and child abuse will be far less common without the State.
Note
The last two objections involve libertarian legal theory. My answer is that this court decision may well be consistent with libertarianism. To understand how this could be the case, see Walter Block’s Libertarianism, positive obligations and property abandonment: children's rights, and Stephan Kinsella’s How We Come to Own Ourselves.
Sunday, 27 February 2011
Ten Books That Influenced Me
These are the books that had the greatest impact on my worldview. All of them are from the last few years, which emcompass my intellectual journey from political apathy and economic naiveté, to being a radical libertarian anarchist and Austrian economist.
I list the books in the order that I (first) read them, with the year in which I first read them in brackets. This post is not to be taken as a blanket endorsement of these books. They are the ones that influenced me most, not those I consider the greatest works, nor those that I would recommend to others necessarily.
1. The Road To Serfdom, F.A. Hayek (2007) – This book introduced me to a new way of thinking about politics. It introduced me to basing political views on principles rather than on whims. I identified myself as an individualist, and became opposed to all forms of collectivism. I understood that governments, even if they start off extremely limited, will always tend to grow, especially if the public has a collectivist mindset.
2. The Revolution: A Manifesto, Ron Paul (2008) – Ron Paul cured my apathy about politics. I found him online in November 2007, and became a massive fan very quickly. He took principled positions, he obviously knew what he was talking about economically, and had held those stances his whole career without wavering or compromising. I began questioning my own views about the role of government. I stopped believing in the left-right paradigm, and started to understand a far better paradigm: libertarianism versus statism.
3. Economics in One Lesson, Henry Hazlitt (2008) – The title is so appealing that I made this the first book on economics I read. I found it through the Ludwig von Mises Institute, which Ron Paul had directed me towards. Immediately, the fallacies of mainstream economics, and the wealth-destroying nature of socialism and all kinds of interventionism, became apparent to me. Hazlitt’s lesson is so remarkably powerful, that I immediately felt confident enough to reveal my political preferences publicly and argue for free markets in practically every area of society. The economic arguments in favor of a state are untenable, and quite obviously so.
4. For A New Liberty, Murray Rothbard (2008) – It took me about 9 months to go from a Ron Paul-inspired limited constitutional government position, to a full libertarian anarchist position. More than any other author, Murray Rothbard deserves most of the credit for that. This book was so clear, and made the case so powerfully, that I instantly saw the superiority of the anarchist position. It was also the first time I had encountered an explanation of how security and law can be provided without a government.
5. Anarchy and the Law, Edward Stringham et al (2008) – This compilation of essays and book excerpts sealed my anarchism. I read alternative justifications for and visions of anarchy: from David Friedman, Linda and Morris Tannehill, Randy Barnett, Roderick Long, Roy Childs, Hans Hermann Hoppe, John Hasnas. These all helped shape my worldview and especially sharpened up my thinking about how security and law can be provided without a state.
6. The Enterprise of Law, Bruce Benson (2009) – This book gave me my first encounter of public-choice economics. Benson took a whole different approach to Rothbard and Friedman, with a great deal of historical, empirical research into customary law, as well as a detailed analysis of the state law-making process and how it compares to law produced by private courts.
7. Democracy: The God That Failed, Hans-Hermann Hoppe (2009) – Just when I thought my political views were fully-formed, Hoppe hit me with his idea that monarchy is superior to democracy (though anarchy is still best of all, of course). I had taken it as given that if we must have a state, let it at least be democratic, and I had always seen the recent historical transition from monarchies to democracies as a positive thing. This book changed my view completely, and gave me a whole lot more reasons to oppose modern states. If we must have a state, let it at least be a monarchy, I now say.
8. Boundaries of Order, Butler Shaffer (2010) – This book played a vital role in my forming my position, contra Rothbard, as a subjectivist ethicist. In particular, it provided me with the terminology that reveals the flaws in his natural rights justification for libertarianism. It allowed me to move past Rothbard and develop a sophisticated subjectivist justification for libertarianism, free from terminological baggage and smuggled norms.
9. The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins (2010) – I thought I understood evolution pretty well, until I read this book. I had not realised the importance of asking at what level evolution takes place. It is at the level of the gene, and this has enormous implications for how we view evolution. I was struck by the beauty and structure to be found in nature and evolution, as Dawkins masterfully described. I was fascinated by the idea that morality can be explained in evolutionary terms; this idea fit perfectly with my subjective ethics worldview.
10. How The Mind Works, Steven Pinker (2010) – This book is full of remarkable ideas, about how our minds evolved to deal with reality. It brings to life the story of how and why we developed language, self-awareness and morality. I have not yet fully absorbed all that this book has to offer, and will probably need to read it a few more times before I feel I have a good grasp on it. But I already feel that it has had a profound affect on my thinking.
Looking over my list, the thing that jumps out at me is that there is no Ludwig von Mises. He will have to be contented that his views influenced me through others: particularly Rothbard, Hoppe, Hazlitt and Paul. Human Action, Theory and History and Socialism come closest to being on this list. His shorter works, The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality, Profit and Loss, and Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth all deserve a mention as well.
Murray Rothbard is probably my single greatest influence, and if I had the space, would have had more than one entry in this top ten. I learned economics from Man, Economy and State, and The Ethics of Liberty was highly influential as well. Rothbard’s crowning glory, however, has to be his epic A History of Economic Thought, which shows off his masterly scholarly skills, and wonderful writing style, to the maximum.
Some more short works that influenced me include The Politics of Disobedience (Etienne de la Boetie), The Production of Security (Gustave de Molinari), No Treason (Lysander Spooner), Against Intellectual Property (Stephan Kinsella) and The Depoliticization of Law (John Hasnas).
I list the books in the order that I (first) read them, with the year in which I first read them in brackets. This post is not to be taken as a blanket endorsement of these books. They are the ones that influenced me most, not those I consider the greatest works, nor those that I would recommend to others necessarily.
1. The Road To Serfdom, F.A. Hayek (2007) – This book introduced me to a new way of thinking about politics. It introduced me to basing political views on principles rather than on whims. I identified myself as an individualist, and became opposed to all forms of collectivism. I understood that governments, even if they start off extremely limited, will always tend to grow, especially if the public has a collectivist mindset.
2. The Revolution: A Manifesto, Ron Paul (2008) – Ron Paul cured my apathy about politics. I found him online in November 2007, and became a massive fan very quickly. He took principled positions, he obviously knew what he was talking about economically, and had held those stances his whole career without wavering or compromising. I began questioning my own views about the role of government. I stopped believing in the left-right paradigm, and started to understand a far better paradigm: libertarianism versus statism.
3. Economics in One Lesson, Henry Hazlitt (2008) – The title is so appealing that I made this the first book on economics I read. I found it through the Ludwig von Mises Institute, which Ron Paul had directed me towards. Immediately, the fallacies of mainstream economics, and the wealth-destroying nature of socialism and all kinds of interventionism, became apparent to me. Hazlitt’s lesson is so remarkably powerful, that I immediately felt confident enough to reveal my political preferences publicly and argue for free markets in practically every area of society. The economic arguments in favor of a state are untenable, and quite obviously so.
4. For A New Liberty, Murray Rothbard (2008) – It took me about 9 months to go from a Ron Paul-inspired limited constitutional government position, to a full libertarian anarchist position. More than any other author, Murray Rothbard deserves most of the credit for that. This book was so clear, and made the case so powerfully, that I instantly saw the superiority of the anarchist position. It was also the first time I had encountered an explanation of how security and law can be provided without a government.
5. Anarchy and the Law, Edward Stringham et al (2008) – This compilation of essays and book excerpts sealed my anarchism. I read alternative justifications for and visions of anarchy: from David Friedman, Linda and Morris Tannehill, Randy Barnett, Roderick Long, Roy Childs, Hans Hermann Hoppe, John Hasnas. These all helped shape my worldview and especially sharpened up my thinking about how security and law can be provided without a state.
6. The Enterprise of Law, Bruce Benson (2009) – This book gave me my first encounter of public-choice economics. Benson took a whole different approach to Rothbard and Friedman, with a great deal of historical, empirical research into customary law, as well as a detailed analysis of the state law-making process and how it compares to law produced by private courts.
7. Democracy: The God That Failed, Hans-Hermann Hoppe (2009) – Just when I thought my political views were fully-formed, Hoppe hit me with his idea that monarchy is superior to democracy (though anarchy is still best of all, of course). I had taken it as given that if we must have a state, let it at least be democratic, and I had always seen the recent historical transition from monarchies to democracies as a positive thing. This book changed my view completely, and gave me a whole lot more reasons to oppose modern states. If we must have a state, let it at least be a monarchy, I now say.
8. Boundaries of Order, Butler Shaffer (2010) – This book played a vital role in my forming my position, contra Rothbard, as a subjectivist ethicist. In particular, it provided me with the terminology that reveals the flaws in his natural rights justification for libertarianism. It allowed me to move past Rothbard and develop a sophisticated subjectivist justification for libertarianism, free from terminological baggage and smuggled norms.
9. The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins (2010) – I thought I understood evolution pretty well, until I read this book. I had not realised the importance of asking at what level evolution takes place. It is at the level of the gene, and this has enormous implications for how we view evolution. I was struck by the beauty and structure to be found in nature and evolution, as Dawkins masterfully described. I was fascinated by the idea that morality can be explained in evolutionary terms; this idea fit perfectly with my subjective ethics worldview.
10. How The Mind Works, Steven Pinker (2010) – This book is full of remarkable ideas, about how our minds evolved to deal with reality. It brings to life the story of how and why we developed language, self-awareness and morality. I have not yet fully absorbed all that this book has to offer, and will probably need to read it a few more times before I feel I have a good grasp on it. But I already feel that it has had a profound affect on my thinking.
Looking over my list, the thing that jumps out at me is that there is no Ludwig von Mises. He will have to be contented that his views influenced me through others: particularly Rothbard, Hoppe, Hazlitt and Paul. Human Action, Theory and History and Socialism come closest to being on this list. His shorter works, The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality, Profit and Loss, and Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth all deserve a mention as well.
Murray Rothbard is probably my single greatest influence, and if I had the space, would have had more than one entry in this top ten. I learned economics from Man, Economy and State, and The Ethics of Liberty was highly influential as well. Rothbard’s crowning glory, however, has to be his epic A History of Economic Thought, which shows off his masterly scholarly skills, and wonderful writing style, to the maximum.
Some more short works that influenced me include The Politics of Disobedience (Etienne de la Boetie), The Production of Security (Gustave de Molinari), No Treason (Lysander Spooner), Against Intellectual Property (Stephan Kinsella) and The Depoliticization of Law (John Hasnas).
Monday, 10 January 2011
A Critique of Murray Rothbard's Idea of a "Basic Legal Code"
Here is a passage from The Ethics of Liberty:
Firstly: how detailed it this basic law code? Consider the two extremes:
Rothbard says that the basic law code will be agreed upon by all reasonable courts. I take him to mean everybody except serial killers, rapists etc, i.e. 99% of the population. With such widespread agreement required, it seems hopelessly unrealistic to suppose that the basic law code is narrowly defined, down to the last detail. Even among libertarians, there is a disagreement over IP, abortion, punishments, etc. There is no way the entire population of reasonable people is going to agree on every little detail of libertarian theory. The entire field of economic analysis of law - how laws get produced and what kinds of laws get produced - is skipped over by making this supposition.
To Rothbard, there were two types of court: reasonable courts, which have signed up to the basic law code, and outlaw courts, which have not. Rothbard does not provide any analysis - any mechanism - of how reasonable courts and outlaw courts will resolve disputes between them. This may not be much of an issue if we assume 99% of courts are reasonable, but see above.
So maybe the basic law code is broadly defined, leaving a lot of scope for interpretation, so that widespread agreement is possible. But then how will disputes about things which might fall into the area of interpretation - say IP disputes - get resolved? There needs to be a mechanism to explain this... how disputes between courts which have both agreed to the basic (broadly defined) law code will be resolved, when their interpretation of that law code differs. Rothbard has not provided us with a mechanism for this.
David Friedman, in chapter 29 of The Machinery of Freedom, has described a mechanism for how courts which provide different laws (perhaps very different laws) will resolve their disputes: the bargaining process.
[L]aw and the State are both conceptually and historically separable, and law would develop in an anarchistic market society without any form of State. Specifically, the concrete form of anarchist legal institutions—judges, arbitrators, procedural methods for resolving disputes, etc.—would indeed grow by a market invisible-hand process, while the basic Law Code (requiring that no one invade any one else’s person and property) would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies, just as all the competing judges once agreed to apply and extend the basic principles of the customary or common law. But the latter, again, would imply no unified legal system or dominant protective agency. Any agencies that transgressed the basic libertarian code would be open outlaws and aggressors, and Nozick himself concedes that, lacking legitimacy, such outlaw agencies would probably not do very well in an anarchist society.Here is the problem as I see it, with this idea of a "basic law code"...
Firstly: how detailed it this basic law code? Consider the two extremes:
- Broadly defined. "No one may invade anyone else's person and property". No more detail than that. ("Invade" and "property" are not given definitions... that is for the courts to interpret)
- Narrowly defined. The basic law code is identical to the libertarian law code, as developed by Rothbard, Kinsella, Block, etc... down to the details... like the basic law code is specific about IP, abortion, capital punishment, etc. (There is very little scope for interpretation of the basic legal code... the courts task is limited to applying the law code)
Rothbard says that the basic law code will be agreed upon by all reasonable courts. I take him to mean everybody except serial killers, rapists etc, i.e. 99% of the population. With such widespread agreement required, it seems hopelessly unrealistic to suppose that the basic law code is narrowly defined, down to the last detail. Even among libertarians, there is a disagreement over IP, abortion, punishments, etc. There is no way the entire population of reasonable people is going to agree on every little detail of libertarian theory. The entire field of economic analysis of law - how laws get produced and what kinds of laws get produced - is skipped over by making this supposition.
To Rothbard, there were two types of court: reasonable courts, which have signed up to the basic law code, and outlaw courts, which have not. Rothbard does not provide any analysis - any mechanism - of how reasonable courts and outlaw courts will resolve disputes between them. This may not be much of an issue if we assume 99% of courts are reasonable, but see above.
So maybe the basic law code is broadly defined, leaving a lot of scope for interpretation, so that widespread agreement is possible. But then how will disputes about things which might fall into the area of interpretation - say IP disputes - get resolved? There needs to be a mechanism to explain this... how disputes between courts which have both agreed to the basic (broadly defined) law code will be resolved, when their interpretation of that law code differs. Rothbard has not provided us with a mechanism for this.
David Friedman, in chapter 29 of The Machinery of Freedom, has described a mechanism for how courts which provide different laws (perhaps very different laws) will resolve their disputes: the bargaining process.
One can imagine an idealized bargaining process, for this or any other dispute, as follows: Two agencies are negotiating whether to recognize a pro- or anti-capital-punishment court. The pro agency calculates that getting a pro-capital-punishment court will be worth $20,000 a year to its customers; that is the additional amount it can get for its services if they include a guarantee of capital punishment in case of disputes with the other agency. The anti-capital-punishment agency calculates a corresponding figure of $40,000. It offers the pro agency $30,000 a year in exchange for accepting an anti-capital-punishment court. The pro agency accepts. Now the anti-capital-punishment agency can raise its rates enough to bring in an extra $35,000. Its customers are happy, since the guarantee of no capital punishment is worth more than that. The agency is happy; it is getting an extra $5,000 a year profit. The pro agency cuts its rates by an amount that costs it $25,000 a year. This lets it keep its customers and even get more, since the savings is more than enough to make up to them for not getting the court of their choice. It, too, is making a $5,000 a year profit on the transaction. As in any good trade, everyone gains.The same mechanism applies to all courts, so there is no need to call some courts "outlaw courts." Hence the idea of a basic law code dissolves. Each court is just producing laws, which may or may not be close to plumbline libertarian laws.
Saturday, 11 December 2010
Can the Non-Aggression Principle be "proved"?
All political philosophies are concerned with who has ultimate decision-making jurisdiction (ownership rights) over which scarce objects (property). That is, they are concerned with how property rights are assigned. Different political philosophies have different principles by which they assign property rights. Libertarianism is based on the principles of homesteading and voluntary exchange. Those principles are used to determine who owns what, and hence who has what rights.
The Non-Aggression Principle, or NAP, is in one sense trivial, because aggression is really defined as a violation of a legitimate property boundary, so it all depends on what property boundaries are legitimate. Everyone supports "non-aggression", except that libertarians and non-libertarians have a different idea of what constitutes aggression, because they assign property rights according to different principles. In this sense, NAP is a fairly useless term, as it is simply a re-statement of the task of political philosophy: to give meaning to aggression, to explain what constitutes aggression, to say what property boundaries are legitimate.
In another sense, if we take the A of "NAP" as meaning specifically the libertarian idea of aggression, then it is simply a restatement of the libertarian principles for assigning property rights. To "prove the NAP" (in this second sense) would be to "prove the libertarian principles of homesteading and voluntary exchange for assigning property rights".
Can this be proved? To prove it would mean to say that homesteading and voluntary exchange, as principles for assigning property rights, are not just a preference (subjective), but that they are the objectively correct principles for assigning property rights. Hans Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics is one attempt to do this.
What argumentation ethics actually proves, in my opinion, is different. I do not believe it "proves the NAP" or "proves libertarian ethics" which is what I believe it sets out to do. I think the clearest explanation of argumentation ethics comes from Stephan Kinsella: here.
The problem is right here at the start. Is a theory of rights something that can be justified through argumentation? Is there a correct view of rights? Does that question even make sense?
Libertarian rights can be argued for because they are good (they appeal to our human senses of right/wrong) and beneficial (breed prosperity). But this is a justification of libertarianism as a means for already existing ends. It is not justifying them as an end, saying "this is the correct theory of rights, anyone supporting any other theory of rights is incorrect." It is saying "if you think initiating coercion is unethical, or if you just prefer prosperity to poverty, then libertarian ethic is the correct ethic for you".
The rest of Hoppe's argumentation ethics may be (and, I think, is) sound, but what I think it proves is if there is such a thing as objective ethics, i.e. if it is possible to show that one ethic is correct and all others are incorrect, then the libertarian ethic is the only correct and true theory of ethics.
So if a socialist says "I support socialism because it is correct and libertarianism is incorrect", then we could show that he is making a performative contradiction and what he says is not true. If there is such a thing as a correct ethic, libertarianism is it.
But most socialists don't claim that their ethic is correct, just that (they think) it is good and beneficial. The way to counter this is 1) to show that the libertarian ethic is actually the most beneficial ethic (using Austrian economics) and 2) by appealing to their personal ethical values, their sense of justice, of right and wrong, and helping them to see that the socialist ethic is really not one that any good person should be in favor of.
It does not make sense to talk about correctness/incorrectness, and hence of proofs, in the realm of ethics. Ethical values are values; they are subjective. We can appeal to non-libertarians' personal ethical values (showing they conflict with their political ethical values), and we can show them their political ethical values, when implemented via laws, have bad consequences; but we cannot present them with any proof that they are incorrect to hold to the political ethical values that they do. Political philosophy is simply not a subject which has objectively correct and incorrect answers, except as a means of achieving a particular goal.
Note: this is a copy of a post I made at the Mises forums: here.
The Non-Aggression Principle, or NAP, is in one sense trivial, because aggression is really defined as a violation of a legitimate property boundary, so it all depends on what property boundaries are legitimate. Everyone supports "non-aggression", except that libertarians and non-libertarians have a different idea of what constitutes aggression, because they assign property rights according to different principles. In this sense, NAP is a fairly useless term, as it is simply a re-statement of the task of political philosophy: to give meaning to aggression, to explain what constitutes aggression, to say what property boundaries are legitimate.
In another sense, if we take the A of "NAP" as meaning specifically the libertarian idea of aggression, then it is simply a restatement of the libertarian principles for assigning property rights. To "prove the NAP" (in this second sense) would be to "prove the libertarian principles of homesteading and voluntary exchange for assigning property rights".
Can this be proved? To prove it would mean to say that homesteading and voluntary exchange, as principles for assigning property rights, are not just a preference (subjective), but that they are the objectively correct principles for assigning property rights. Hans Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics is one attempt to do this.
What argumentation ethics actually proves, in my opinion, is different. I do not believe it "proves the NAP" or "proves libertarian ethics" which is what I believe it sets out to do. I think the clearest explanation of argumentation ethics comes from Stephan Kinsella: here.
So the question is, does Hoppe's theory establish that the libertarian view of rights, as opposed to competing views, is the correct one?
...
Hoppe starts by noting that if any proposed theory of rights is going to be justified, it has to be justified in the course of an argument (discourse).
The problem is right here at the start. Is a theory of rights something that can be justified through argumentation? Is there a correct view of rights? Does that question even make sense?
Libertarian rights can be argued for because they are good (they appeal to our human senses of right/wrong) and beneficial (breed prosperity). But this is a justification of libertarianism as a means for already existing ends. It is not justifying them as an end, saying "this is the correct theory of rights, anyone supporting any other theory of rights is incorrect." It is saying "if you think initiating coercion is unethical, or if you just prefer prosperity to poverty, then libertarian ethic is the correct ethic for you".
The rest of Hoppe's argumentation ethics may be (and, I think, is) sound, but what I think it proves is if there is such a thing as objective ethics, i.e. if it is possible to show that one ethic is correct and all others are incorrect, then the libertarian ethic is the only correct and true theory of ethics.
So if a socialist says "I support socialism because it is correct and libertarianism is incorrect", then we could show that he is making a performative contradiction and what he says is not true. If there is such a thing as a correct ethic, libertarianism is it.
But most socialists don't claim that their ethic is correct, just that (they think) it is good and beneficial. The way to counter this is 1) to show that the libertarian ethic is actually the most beneficial ethic (using Austrian economics) and 2) by appealing to their personal ethical values, their sense of justice, of right and wrong, and helping them to see that the socialist ethic is really not one that any good person should be in favor of.
It does not make sense to talk about correctness/incorrectness, and hence of proofs, in the realm of ethics. Ethical values are values; they are subjective. We can appeal to non-libertarians' personal ethical values (showing they conflict with their political ethical values), and we can show them their political ethical values, when implemented via laws, have bad consequences; but we cannot present them with any proof that they are incorrect to hold to the political ethical values that they do. Political philosophy is simply not a subject which has objectively correct and incorrect answers, except as a means of achieving a particular goal.
Note: this is a copy of a post I made at the Mises forums: here.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)